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ADDING INJURY TO INSULT: BOWEN AND
THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Vaca v. Sopes I spawned a new breed of duty of fair repre-
sentation claim. Its scope and dimensions are still being
measured. Among the recent attempts by the United States
Supreme Court to clarify Vaca was Bowen v. United States
Postal Service.2 Bowen struggled with the question of
whether damages should be apportioned between the em-
ployer and the union when the employee prevailed in a hy-
brid duty of fair representation/Section 301 suit? The Court
found that the union should bear some portion of the dam-
age award.
The duty of fair representation protects the individual
rights of the employee in the collective bargaining context.
It is usually discussed in legal terms. However, a recent
study4 of the attitudes among union leaders toward the duty
concluded that union representatives considered individual
rights important and inseparable from the collective bar-
gaining process. The relationship was summarized in suc-
cinct terms: "no union, no individual rights. ' 5
The cases and articles briefly surveyed in this comment
reveal that neither the courts nor the academics have exhib-
ited a better understanding of the duty of fair representation
than the union representatives themselves. One might ex-
pect that courts would hesitate to interfere with relationships
as complicated as those in the collective bargaining process.
Yet, in response to a perceived threat to individual rights by
1. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
2. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
3. Section 301 refers to the Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1970). See infra note 18 for the text of the statute.
4. The study is summarized in Schwartz, Different Views ofthe Duty ofFair Rep-
resentation, 34 LAB. L.J. 415 (1983).
5. Id. at 418. As one international representative put it:
If there would be no individual, there would be no union and if there was no
union, there would be no individual rights. Of course, there is a certain
amount of surrendering of individual rights for the benefit of collective action
and the establishment of the structure. But this is finally protective of the indi-
vidual rights. I can't tell you what came first, the chicken or the egg.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:317
the collective bargaining system, the courts have willingly
interposed themselves. Bowen is an example of the effect of
this judicial activism.
This comment will focus on Bowen and the apportion-
ment of damages in duty of fair representation suits. The
first two sections provide a context for the discussion. The
succeeding section examines Bowen. The last section ana-
lyzes the approach taken by the United States Supreme
Court in deciding Bowen and suggests some factors to con-
sider for the analysis of future cases.
II. THE NATURE OF THE DUTY
A. Origins and Context
The purpose of this section is not to trace the history of
the duty of fair representation; that has been more than ade-
quately accomplished by many others. 6  The purpose is
rather to firmly anchor the duty of fair representation in the
context of conventional collective bargaining philosophy. In
analyzing the duty of fair representation, it is important to
bear in mind that the duty functions within the context of a
6. See generally Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
61 CALIF. L. REv. 663 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FellerA General Theory]. See also
J. McKELVEY, THE DuTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION (1977); Clark, The Duty of Fair
Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Edwards, Em-
ployer's Liabilityfor Union Unfair Representation: Fiduciary Duty or Bargaining Real-
ity?, 27 LAB. L.J. 686 (1976); Feller, Vaca v. Spes One Year Later, 21 N.Y.U. CONF.
ON LAB. 141 (1969); Jacobs, The Duty offair Representation: Minorities, Dissidents
and Exclusive Representation, 59 B.U.L. REv. 857 (1979); Kopp, The Duty of Fair
Representation Revisited, 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 3 (1979); Levine & Hollander, The
Union's Duty offair Representation in Contract Administration, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
193 (198 1); Linsey, The Apportionment ofLiabilityfor Damages Between the Employer
and Union in § 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach ofthe Duty ofFair Representa-
tion, 30 MERCER L. REV. 661 (1979); Morris, Duty offair Representation- An Em-
ployer's Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 297 (1976); Waldman, The Duty of
Fair Representation in Arbitration, 29 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 279 (1976); Comment,
The Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies as a Prerequiste to Section 301 Actions
Against Labor Unions and Employers, 55 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 259 (1979); Comment,
The Union's Duty ofFair Representation - Fact or Fiction, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 1116
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Union's Duty]; Comment, Determining
Standards/or a Union's Duty ofFair Representation. The Casefor Ordinary Negli-
gence, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 634 (1980); Comment, Apportionment ofDamages in DFR/
Contract Suits: Who Pays/or the Union's Breach?, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 155. Cf. Feller,
A General Theory, supra, at 664-65 nn.4 & 5.
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collective bargaining agreement.7 Therefore, it is subject to
the same policy determinations and the same stresses and
strains as the collective bargaining system in general.
In his classic article which defined employee rights under
a labor agreement, Archibald Cox enumerated the employee
interests to be protected: (1) the interests of a union as an
organization; (2) the unassorted interests of employees as a
group; (3) the future interests affected by the law-making as-
pects of grievance adjustment; (4) the present interests of
employees who may be in competition with the grievant; and
(5) the interests of the individual who claims he has been
damaged.8 The duty of fair representation as now formu-
lated was developed to protect this last interest, the interest
of the individual when the grievance procedure is controlled
by the union. 9 But the four other interests presented by Cox,
along with the interests of the employer, must not be forgot-
ten. They must be protected as well.
The duty of fair representation is a judicially inferred
statutory duty, arising from the Railway Labor Act' ° and the
7. Part of the difficulty in analyzing duty of fair representation law is that Ameri-
can law has never developed a theory of rights created by a collective bargaining
agreement. Feller, A General Theory, supra note 6, at 664. The principal theories that
have been suggested include: (1) the custom or usage theory in which the agreement
is considered incorporated into the employees' individual employment contracts; (2)
the agency theory whereby the union is considered the agent in a contract between
employer and employees; and (3) the third party beneficiary theory under which the
agreement is considered as one between the union and the employer for the benefit of
the employees. In addition, a trust analogy has been suggested whereby the union
holds the promises of the employer in trust as a fiduciary for the benefit of the em-
ployees. Id. at 663 n.l. But see Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the
Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251
(1977). Professor Summers noted that "[t]he problem presented is not one of choos-
ing theories, for we can draw from them only the contents which we have placed in
them. The problem is one of policy - what rights should an individual have under a
collective bargaining agreement." Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agree-
ments. .4 PreliminaryAnalysis, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 239, 241 (1958) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See generaly Brousseau, Toward a Theory of Rights for the Employment
Relation, 56 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1980).
8. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 615-16 (1956).
See also the "companion" classic article, Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargain-
ing.4greement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1958).
9. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
10. Section 2(4) of the Railway Labor Act provides in relevant part: "Employees
shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the
right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes
1984]
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Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act." It is a duty correlative to the authority granted to the
exclusive representative.' 2 The cases from which the duty
developed arose out of racial discrimination in contract ne-
gotiation,13 but soon the duty was found to protect employ-
ees from other bad faith conduct on the part of unions as
well. In Conley v. Gibson 14 the Supreme Court held that the
duty existed in the application and enforcement of a contract
as well as in its negotiation. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) found the breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation to be an unfair labor practice in NLRB v. Miranda
Fuel Co. 15
To this point the law relating to the duty of fair represen-
tation developed on its own. However, an entirely separate
line of cases was forming which soon converged with fair
representation law.' 6 Smith v. Evening News Association"
established the individual employee's right to bring an ac-
tion under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act."8 In order for an individual employee to bring a Sec-
of this chapter .... Railway Labor Act § 2(4), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
11. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment....
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
12. This rationale was first articulated in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944), decided under the Railway Labor Act. The Court concluded
that the authority of the statutory representative necessarily carried with it "the duty
to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts,
without hostile discrimination against them." Id. at 203. The Court later applied the
same reasoning to cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act. See Syres v.
Oil Workers Int'l Union Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953).
13. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
14. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
15. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
The development of fair representation law under the National Labor Relations Act
will not be considered in this comment.
16. See generally Comment, Apportionment of Damages in DRF/Contract Suits.-
Who Pays/or the Union's Breach?, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 155, 156-60.
17. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
18. Section 301(a) of the Act provides:
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tion 301 action, however, the employee is required to ex-
haust the contractual grievance and arbitration procedures.' 9
This exhaustion requirement 2 was a reflection of the
congressional 2' and judicial2 2 determination that the griev-
ance-arbitration process was central to national labor pol-
icy. 23 As the Supreme Court said in Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox,24 a rule contrary to the exhaustion requirement
would deprive employer and union of the ability to estab-
lish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement
of employee grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United State having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizen of the parties.
Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976 & Supp. III
1979). The Court had earlier allowed individual claims under the auspices of the
Railway Labor Act. See Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), afdon
rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946); Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
19. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
20. The exhaustion requirement includes exhaustion of contractual remedies and
also internal union remedies. See, e.g., Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th
Cir. 1973); Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968). But see Clayton v.
Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679 (1981) and infra note 58. See also Comment, The
Exhaustion ofInternal Union Remedies as a Prerequisite to Section 301 Actions Against
Labor Unions and Employers, 55 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 259 (1979).
21. The Labor Management Relations Act Section 203(2) provides for final ad-
justment of grievances: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
• . . the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the appli-
cation or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement." Labor Man-
agement Relations Act § 203(2), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
22. The Supreme Court established the important role of arbitration in the so-
called "Steelworker's Trilogy" which included: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960). In Warrior, the Court declared that "[a] major factor in achieving
industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the
collective bargaining agreement . . . . [A]rbitration is the substitute for industrial
strike . . . [and] is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself." War-
rior, 363 U.S. at 578.
23. The usual advantages mentioned in conjunction with arbitration include: (1)
promptness and efficiency in resolving grievances; (2) informality in that the arbitra-
tion procedure can be conducted by nonprofessional employee and employer repre-
sentat-ies; (3) adequate consideration of the "common law" of the shop which might
not be fully reflected in the written agreement; (4) the final and binding character of
arbitration which not only resolves the dispute but also interprets the contract for
future guidance. Waldman, supra note 6, at 279.
24. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a
method of settlement. A rule creating such a situation
"would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both
the negotiation and administration of collective
agreements. 25
Proper respect for the finality of arbitration decisions
when the parties have agreed to arbitration is concomitant to
the important position of the grievance-arbitration mecha-
nism in labor relations.26 The Maddox Court determined
that an employee would not be allowed to judicially reliti-
gate a grievance settled by final and binding arbitration. 7
However, Maddox left open a possible exception to that
rule. In a case in which "the union refuses to press or only
perfunctorily presses the individual's claim, differences may
arise as to the forms of redress then available. ' 28 This inti-
mation of an exception to the finality rule foreshadowed the
problems which would attend the combination of Section
301 actions with duty of fair representation suits.
The Court mentioned the possibility of such a combina-
tion in Humphrey v. Moore.29 In Vaca v. Spes30 three years
after Moore, the Court expressly acknowledged the propri-
ety of a duty of fair representation/Section 301 suit.3 1 In a
hybrid suit, proof of a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion will remove the exhaustion requirement and allow the
employee to press a Section 301 action for breach of the col-
lective bargaining agreement by the employer. In Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. ,32 the Supreme Court found that
25. Id. at 653 (quoting Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103
(1962)).
26. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960), the Supreme Court found that "[t]he refusal of courts to review the merits of
an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be un-
dermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards." But see Hoellering,
Finality in Arbitration: How Final?, 34 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 119 (1982); Waldman,
supra note 6; Address by Bernard F. Ashe, American Arbitration Ass'n (May 18,
1983), reprinted in GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 1171 (1983).
27. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
28. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652.
29. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
30. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
31. Id. at 187.
32. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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even an arbitration decision was not final if a union had
breached its duty during the arbitration process.3 3 One com-
mentator succinctly summarized the effect of the breach of
the duty of fair representation in the context of arbitration:
The union will be liable in damages to the aggrieved em-
ployee .... It will also be subject to a Labor Board un-
fair labor practice order. The award itself will no longer be
regarded as final and conclusive, and the employer can no
longer rely upon it as a shield or defense to a breach of
contract suit by the employee.34
Although claims for the breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation are today seldom, if ever, brought separately from a
Section 301 claim, the two claims are distinct 35 and the na-
ture of each is quite different.
B. The Standard
The early cases required that a union represent each of
the members of the bargaining unit "without hostile discrim-
ination, fairly, impartially and in good faith. ' 36 The stan-
dard was vague and difficult to apply but it insured that the
unions would have some flexibility in representation. 37 Al-
though urged to retain a good faith standard,38 the Court in
Paca v. Sopes39 instead expanded the standard into a three-
pronged test, finding a breach of the duty when the union's
33. The Hines Court stated:
In our view, enforcement of the finality provision where the arbitrator has
erred is conditioned upon the union's having satisfied its statutory duty fairly
to represent the employee in connection with the arbitration proceedings.
Wrongfully discharged employees would [otherwise] be left without jobs and
without a fair opportunity to secure an adequate remedy.
424 U.S. at 571.
34. Waldman, supra note 6, at 284.
35. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 28 (1970) (referring to the Railway Labor
Act).
36. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
37. Isaacson, From the Editor: The Duty of Fair Representation.- Protecting the
Protectedfrom Their Protectors, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 1, 1 (1980).
38. Some commentators have distinguished the need for flexibility in contract
negotiation as being greater than that necessary for contract administration. The
early cases applying the good faith standard were contract negotiation situations. See
Summers, supra note 7, at 254-63. But see Address by William J. Isaacson, American
Arbitration Ass'n (May 18, 1983), reprinted in 21 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 1165
(1983).
39. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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conduct was "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith." 40
The factual situation in Vaca is typical of duty of fair
representation cases involving a discharge. 41 Owens, the em-
ployee, was discharged from his job at a packing plant be-
cause his blood pressure was too high to permit him to do
heavy work. The union processed his grievance through the
fourth step of a five-step grievance procedure, but refused to
go to arbitration after an independent doctor examined
Owens (at union expense) and confirmed that his condition
was poor. Owens sued the union4 2 alleging that the union
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to take his
grievance to arbitration.43
The Court, sustaining its new test, found that as a matter
of law, the union had not breached its duty.44 And even as
the Court was establishing a standard which would allow
greater judicial interference in the grievance process, 45 it
confirmed the need of the union for flexibility in contract
administration. An employee did not have an absolute right
to arbitration. The settlement process was necessary to elim-
inate frivolous grievances, to insure consistency in the inter-
40. Id. at 190.
41. Most apportionment problems arise in relation to the large damage awards
sustained in discharge cases. However, duty of fair representation/Section 301 suits
are instituted over other issues as well. See, e.g., Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator
Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980) (seniority rights); Schultz v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
560 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1977) (right to participate in an apprenticeship program); Mau-
rer v. UAW, 487 F. Supp. 731 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (negotiation of a provision which
abrogated a prior arbitral award).
42. Although Vaca opened the door to hybrid duty of fair representation/Section
301 suits, it was not itself such a suit; the employer was not joined.
43. At trial the jury awarded Owens $7,000 in compensatory damages and $3,300
in punitive damages. The trial judge set aside the verdict, holding that the NLRB had
exclusive jurisdiction. The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed but the Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed and reinstated the verdict.
Although it is not often noted, the main issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was
whether the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction and "if not, whether the finding of
Union liability and the relief afforded Owens are consistent with governing principles
of federal law." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 174. This second, vague issue opened Pandora's
box and let out, in dicta, that which the courts have been struggling with for years.
See id. at 198-203 (Fortas, J., concurring). In view of the lack of agreement on almost
every issue - three justices concurred in the result but disagreed in nearly every other
issue; Justice Black, dissenting, disagreed on every issue - it is perhaps surprising
that the opinion was accorded such strong precedential value.
44. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 193.
45. See Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1168-71.
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pretation and treatment of grievances and to support the
bargaining authority of the union.4 6 Moreover, compelled
arbitration would undermine the settlement process and
cause more grievances to be arbitrated. This would in turn
increase the cost, clog the grievance machinery and ulti-
mately destroy the grievance-arbitration mechanism.47
The lower courts, undoubtedly confused by the mixed
signals of the Court regarding its new test, reacted inconsis-
tently. Several of the earlier cases appeared to ignore the
"arbitrary" prong of the Vaca test.48 In Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge49 the Court went so far as to indicate, in
dictum, that there must be "substantial evidence of fraud,
deceitful action or dishonest conduct. ' 50 The wide variety of
standards available to the courts has provided material for
numerous commentaries.:' In sum, the trend is for courts to
46. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191. See also Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1170-71; Wald-
man, supra note 6, at 291-93.
47. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-92. Accord Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554 (1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); St. Clair v. Local
Union No. 515 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969).
48. Summers, supra note 7, at 260 n.35.
49. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
50. Id. at 299 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)). A line of
cases has always followed the Lockridge standard. See Comment, supra note 16, at
157 n.14. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted a bad faith standard
in Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981). As that court recently ex-
plained in Superczynski v. P.T.O. Servs., Inc., 706 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1983): "Hoffman
holds that a union breaches its duty to fairly represent a worker if it deliberately and
unjustifiably refuses to represent that worker in processing a grievance. The union's
misconduct must be intentional." Id. at 202. The Superczynski court went on to
quote Lockridge extensively.
51. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 6; Feller, A General Theory, supra note 6; Kopp,
supra note 6; Steinhauer, IBEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the Duo of Fair
Representation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1981); Summers, supra note 7; Comment,
Determining Standards/or a Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The Casefor Ordi-
nary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1980); Comment, The Union'r Duty, supra
note 6; Comment, The Duty of Fair Representation: The Emerging Standard of the
Union's Duty in the Context of Negligent, Arbitrary, or Perfunctory Grievance Adminis-
tration, 46 Mo. L. REV. 142 (1981).
The newest trend among commentators on the subject is to discard the tort model
altogether and develop a new theoretical model. See, e.g., Cheit, Competing Models of
Fair Representation: The Perfunctory Processing Cases, 24 B.C.L. REv. 1 (1982); Van-
derVelde, A Fair Process Modelfor the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L.
REv. 1079 (1983); Comment, The Duty of Fair Representation in Grievance Administra-
tion: A Specfc Test Modeled on Judge Bazelon's Dissent in United States v.
DeCoster, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 185 (1982). Cheit and VanderVelde espouse a
due process approach. Cheit enthusiastically presents his model as a method for reg-
1984]
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interpret each prong of the Vaca test separately52 and to in-
terpret the arbitrary prong to include perfunctory53 and even
negligent54 conduct.5 5  The result of penalizing perfunctory
and negligent conduct is to make it easier for an employee to
allege a claim against his union, to increase the possibility of
a challenge to the finality of an arbitration award and to
make damage awards more likely.
C. The Procedural and Remedial Issues
As noted above, Vaca v. Sojpes 56 created more issues than
it resolved. 7 The Supreme Court has slowly unravelled the
knotty procedural problems presented by exhaustion 58 and
ulating union behavior rather than for merely compensating the individual. Cheit,
supra, at 28.
52. But see supra text accompanying note 50.
53. See, e.g., IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (1980);
Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974).
54. The ninth circuit is the only one to have explicitly adopted a negligence stan-
dard. See Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3532 (9th Cir.
1983) (court found that union negligence may breach the duty of fair representation
where the individual stake is large and the union's action completely extinguishes the
employee's right to pursue a claim).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit seemed to adopt a negligence standard
in Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp. (Ruzicka 1), 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975). See
Morgan, Fair is Foul, and Foul is Fair - Ruzicka and the Duty of Representation in the
Circuit Courts, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 335 (1980). The case was remanded. On appeal
for the second time, Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp. (Ruzicka 11), 649 F.2d 1207
(6th Cir. 1981), the court carefully explained that the language to the contrary in
Ruzicka I had been dicta and that a union's breach of the duty could not be predi-
cated on simple negligence. Id. at 1211-12. On remand, again, the case was dis-
missed. The dismissal was affirmed in Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 707 F.2d
259 (6th Cir. 1983). The Ruzicka saga exemplifies the difficulties presented by the
arbitrary prong of the Vaca test.
55. In discussing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 42 (1979), one
commentator expressed this concern:
There is a vast difference between "perfunctory," even incompetent, repre-
sentation and bad faith, discriminatory or arbitrary representation. The
Supreme Court's opinion never makes clear that perfunctory, incompetent rep-
resentation will not suffice to overcome an arbitration award; indeed, it implies
the contrary. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court is permitting
a trier of facts to transform "bad performance" into "bad faith performance."
Waldman, supra note 6, at 287-88.
56. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
57. See supra note 43.
58. Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679 (1981), settled one of the big
exhaustion issues. The employee had filed a duty of fair representation/Section 301
[Vol. 67:317
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most recently, the statute of limitations.59 The remedial
questions have been equally complicated and, if possible,
more perplexing to the lower courts.
Rejecting the union's contention that an employee
should be limited to the remedy of compelled arbitration
when successful in a breach of the duty of fair representation
suit, the Court in Vaca commented that:
[A]n order compelling arbitration should be viewed as one
of the available remedies when a breach of the union's
duty is proved. But we see no reason inflexibly to require
arbitration in all cases ... the court should be free to de-
cide the contractual claim and to award the employee ap-
propriate damages or equitable relief.60
In so rejecting compelled arbitration the court discarded the
most reasonable method to forestall judicial meddling in the
grievance-arbitration process 6' short of NLRB preemption.6 z
The courts have taken notice that the normal remedy when
wrongful discharge suits are submitted to arbitration is the
equitable remedy of reinstatement with back pay;63 they
have decided, however, that prospective damages may some-
times be a less drastic remedy and have specifically reserved
the right to award them.64
suit before having exhausted the internal union remedies provided by the union con-
stitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held that the failure to
exhaust barred the suit against the union but not the suit against the employer. The
Supreme Court distinguished between contractual and internal remedies and con-
cluded that when the internal remedy could neither reactivate the grievance nor pro-
vide as much relief as a Section 301 suit, the failure to exhaust would not bar the suit
against the employer or the union when the employee had brought a hybrid suit.
59. In the combined cases of DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters and United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Flowers, 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983), the Supreme Court held that
in a hybrid suit the six-month statute of limitations governing suits under Section
10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), would apply. The
Court declined to apply an analogous state statute of limitations because the choices
- contract, action to vacate, malpractice - each suffered legal and practical flaws.
DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2287-90.
60. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 196.
61. Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1169.
62. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 198-202 (Fortas, J., concurring).
63. See, e.g., Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 211 (5th Cir. 1982); St. Clair
v. Local Union No. 515 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969).
64. See, e.g., Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 211 (5th Cir. 1982); Figueroa
de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 290-92 (Ist Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
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Damage awards are frequently quite large.65 An award
principally consists of compensatory damages for back pay
subject to mitigation.6 Attorney's fees and court costs are
fairly well established components of the damage award
when a union is found to have breached the duty of fair rep-
resentation in bad faith.67 Prejudgment interest is not al-
lowed,68 nor are consequential damages such as humiliation
and embarrassment or loss of a home.69
IBE W v. Foust70 has apparently removed the possibility
of recovering punitive damages in a duty of fair representa-
tion/Section 301 suit.7' The Court in Foust found that puni-
tive damages were not in keeping with congressionally
expressed labor relations policy which is "essentially reme-
dial" in nature.72 The fundamental purpose of unfair repre-
sentation suits is to compensate for injuries, not to punish.73
The Foust Court's analysis was exemplary. The Court con-
65. See, e.g., IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 45 (1979) ($40,000); Seymour v. Olin
Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 1982) ($139,177.02 plus $39,368.75 in attorney's
fee); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1981)
($20,000). See also Comment, supra note 16, at 155-56 n.4.
66. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Local Union No. 515 of International Bhd. of Teamsters,
422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969); Comment, supra note 16, at 162.
67. See, e.g., Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 211 (5th Cir. 1982); Scott v.
Teamsters Local 377, 548 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1977); Holodnack v. Avco Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 191, 206 (D. Conn. 1974).
68. Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d
281, 290 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
69. Id. at 293 (mental damages); St. Clair v. Local Union No. 515 International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969) (humiliation and embarrass-
ment, loss of home). But see Farmer v. ARA Servs., Inc., 660 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir.
1981) in which the court held that damages for emotional and mental distress may be
awarded when the union's breach also results from its wrongful participation in the
breach of contract or from the negotiation of discriminatory contract provisions. The
union in such a case may be held jointly and severally liable with the employer.
70. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
7 1. Punitive damages had been awarded in the past but the courts were divided.
See, e.g., Richardson v. Communication Workers, 443 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1971) (puni-
tive damages recoverable); Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970)
(punitive damages not properly recoverable). The issue may still not be settled. See,
for example, Anderson v. Paperworkers Union, 484 F. Supp. 76 (D. Minn. 1980), in
which punitive damages were awarded. The court distinguished Foust as involving
arbitrary conduct, while in Anderson the union had misrepresented an important fact
regarding a contract provision. Anderson was, however, reversed on other grounds in
Anderson v. Paperworkers Union, 641 F.2d 574, 581 n.9 (8th Cir. 1981), so the issue
was never reached.
72. Foust, 442 U.S. at 52.
73. Id. at 49.
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sidered the financial burden such awards would place on un-
ions and the consequent effect on their exercise of discretion
in the handling of grievances. 74 The Court recognized that
union discretion was "essential to the proper functioning of
the collective-bargaining system." 7  Most importantly, in
Foust the Court balanced the interests of the union, the col-
lective employees and the injured individual: "This limita-
tion on union liability thus reflects an attempt to afford
individual employees redress for injuries caused by union
misconduct without compromising the collective interests of
union members in protecting limited funds. 7 6
III. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
A. Vaca and Progeny
There is little discussion in the pre-Vaca cases about the
apportionment of liability. In these cases the union and em-
ployer were generally held jointly liable. The earliest cases
were, of course, discrimination cases. Even today a union
and employer may be held jointly liable if they have both
conducted themselves in a discriminatory manner.77 One
writer has theorized that the lack of analysis may have also
been due to the nature of the relief sought; the plaintiffs
joined their employers solely for the purpose of blocking the
enforcement of discriminatory provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement.78
The Supreme Court, perhaps responding to the lack of
authority on the apportionment problem, took the opportu-
nity provided by Vaca v. Spes79 to lay down a "governing
principle":
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability
between the employer and the union according to the dam-
age caused by the fault of each. Thus, damages attributa-
ble solely to the employer's breach of contract should not
74. Id. at 50-51.
75. Id. at 51.
76. Id. at 50. Justice Blackmun, however, objected to a per se rule. Id. at 52-61
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
77. Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 215 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Pacific Coast Util. Serv., 638 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1980).
78. Linsey, supra note 6, at 664-69.
79. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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be charged to the union, but increases if any in those dam-
ages caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance
should not be charged to the employer."0
The Court offered no other guidance in Vaca. Instead, it
further confused the issue.
The confusion arose, first of all, from the Court's appar-
ent uncertainty about the legal nature of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. One expert asserts that the Vaca Court
adopted the Steelworker's Trilogy81 view of the collective
bargaining agreement as "not simply a contract, but a code
to govern the relationship between those functioning in the
capacity of employer and employee. 8 2 This theory might
support its apportionment principle which did not seem to
distinguish the contractual relationship between employer
and employee from the duty of care owed by the union to
the employee. However, the Court did expressly acknowl-
edge the distinction between the two duties:
A more difficult question is, what portion of the em-
ployee's damages may be charged to the union: in particu-
lar, may an award against a union include, as it did here,
damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of
contract? We think not. Though the union has violated a
statutory duty in failing to press the grievance, it is the em-
ployer's unrelated breach of contract which triggered the
controversy and which caused this portion of the em-
ployee's damages.83
Justice Fortas perceived the fundamental inconsistency in
the Court's position, stating:
The Court's difficulty, it seems to me, reflects the basic
awkwardness of its position: It is attempting to force into
the posture of a contract violation an alleged default of the
union which is not a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement but a breach of its separate and basic duty fairly
to represent all employees in the unit. 4
80. Id. at 197-98.
81. See supra note 22.
82. Feller,A, General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L.
REv. 663, 696 (1973). Feller was counsel for the union in Vaca and the author of the
above article which has become a much cited classic on the duty of fair
representation.
83. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197.
84. Id. at 201-02 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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Secondly, besides blurring the nature of the respective
breaches by the employer and the union, the Court strongly
implied that the union's damages would be de minimis in a
Vaca-type factual situation. In this case, the Court said:
[E]ven if the Union had breached its duty, all or almost all
of Owens' damages would still be attributable to his alleg-
edly wrongful discharge by Swift. For these reasons, even
if the Union here had properly been found liable for a
breach of duty, it is clear that the damage award was
improper. 5
The Supreme Court left the "dirty work" of actually appor-
tioning liability to the lower courts, giving them no further
comment of precedential value.86
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. ,87 decided almost ten
years after Vaca, presented the Court with an opportunity to
assist.88 In Hines the Court held that although a final arbi-
tration decision had been decided in the employer's favor,
the employer had been improperly dismissed from the duty
of fair representation/Section 301 suit. The Court con-
cluded that "[p]etitioners, if they prove an erroneous dis-
charge. . . are entitled to an appropriate remedy against the
employer as well as the Union. ' 89 The Court, however, de-
clined to go further. Only Justice Stewart, in a concurring
opinion, addressed the apportionment issue: "If an em-
ployer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitral decision,
then his failure to reinstate discharged employees cannot be
anything but rightful, until there is a contrary determination.
Liability for the intervening wage loss must fall not on the
employer but on the union."90
As the result of the dicta in Vaca and Hines, the lower
courts generally followed two91 different approaches92 prior
85. 386 U.S. at 198.
86. Linsey, supra note 6, at 670-71.
87. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
88. Linsey, supra note 6, at 672; Comment, supra note 16, at 165.
89. Hines, 424 U.S. at 572.
90. Id. at 573 (Stewart, J., concurring).
91. A third line of cases following Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d
306 (6th Cir. 1975), imposed joint liability; but that is generally considered to be an
errant approach, absent intentional conduct on the part of the union. Linsey, supra
note 6, at 675. But see Comment, supra note 16, at 170 (describing Ruzicka as a
middle ground between the majority and the Stewart approaches).
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to Bowen in apportioning liability in a duty of fair represen-
tation/Section 301 suit. Courts taking one approach, desig-
nated herein as the "majority approach, ' 93 ignored the
theoretical confusion in Vaca and viewed the wrongful con-
duct of the employer as a breach of contract and the behav-
ior of the union as a breach of statutory duty analogous to a
tort.94 Consequently, these courts found that a union cannot
be held liable for the contract damages, that is, back pay,
resulting from the employer's breach of contract.95 This ap-
proach takes strength from a literal interpretation of the lan-
guage of Vaca implying de minimis liability on the part of
the union.96
Other courts took what has been termed the "Stewart ap-
proach"97 and have apportioned some of the liability to the
union.98 Both approaches are based upon confficting causal
analyses. 99 The majority approach takes the position that
"but for" the employer's breach of the contract the employee
would not have been injured and, therefore, the employer
has caused the damage and should pay for its cost.' °0 More-
92. Comment, supra note 16, at 156.
93. One commentator labeled this approach the "aca approach". See id. at 166.
This is rather confusing, however, because both approaches claim to have their basis
in Vaca.
94. See, e.g., Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 1982); Milstead
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1981).
95. See, e.g., Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Seymour, 666 F.2d 202; Mil-
stead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981); Bowen v.
United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981); Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindi-
cato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877
(1970).
96. Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 1982); Milstead v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1981); Wyatt v. Interstate &
Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 892-93 (4th Cir. 1980); Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindi-
cato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 289-90 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 877 (1970); St. Clair v. Local Union No. 515 of International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969).
97. Comment, supra note 16, at 182.
98. See, e.g., Battle v. Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978); Foust v.
IBEW, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979);
Harrison v. Chrysler, 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Harrison v. United Transp.
Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); Bowen v.
United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127 (W.D. Va. 1979).
99. Comment, supra note 16, at 164.
100. See Brief for Respondent Union at 37-40, Bowen v. United States Postal
Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
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over, the employer, not the union, is alone able to reinstate
the employee. The Stewart approach, on the other hand, im-
plies that "but for" the union's breach of its duty of fair rep-
resentation the employee would have been made whole at an
earlier date.' 10 Therefore, the union ought to be held re-
sponsible for any loss, including back pay, which accrues
from the estimated date when the grievance would have
been settled had the employee been fairly represented, until
the date of judgment.
B. Seymour v. Olin Corp.
Seymour v. Olin Corp. 102 best exemplifies the majority
approach. Seymour, an electrician employed by Olin Corp.,
was discharged for allegedly selling wire stolen from the
company. Seymour notified his union of the termination
and a union representative commenced investigation.
Shortly after that, Seymour hired his own attorney. The
union representative met with Seymour and informed him
that the union was willing to press his grievance. However,
upon learning that Seymour had hired his own attorney, the
union representatives explained that it was their policy not
to allow outside attorneys to participate in union business.
Seymour refused to give up private counsel, the union re-
fused to file the grievance and the time limits passed without
a grievance being filed. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the union's conduct had "exceeded the lim-
its of its right of exclusive representation and ignored a sub-
stantial interest of Seymour. . .in obtaining informed legal
advice from competent counsel of one's own choosing"'10 3
and was therefore arbitrary.
The court turned to the issue of damages by first approv-
ing the award of prospective damages, finding substantial
evidence that reinstatement was not feasible. 1°4 The court
101. See Brief for Federal Respondent at 23-34, Bowen v. United States Postal
Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983). See also Linsey, supra note 6, at 678-79; Martucci, Em-
ployer Liabilityfor Union Unfair Representation: The Judicial Predilection and Under-
lying Policy Considerations, 46 Mo. L. REv. 78, 108-20 (1981).
102. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
103. Id. at 208.
104. Id. at 211. Seymour and his family had moved from Tallahassee, the loca-
tion of the corporation, to Atlanta.
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then considered Olin's argument that it was responsible only
for those damages that accrued prior to the time that an ar-
bitrator would have issued an award had the grievance pro-
cess been followed and that any subsequent damages should
have been charged against the union. 10 5 In firmly rejecting
Olin's contention, the court of appeals first quoted the "gov-
erning principle" language from Vaca. The court noted
that, under Olin's theory, if the union in Vaca had breached
its duty of fair representation, the union could have been
liable for three years' worth of back pay. On the contrary,
the Vaca Court clearly "held" that the union's share would
have been de minimis.1°6 The Court cited with approval
other majority approach cases. 0 7 Indications of a contrary
approach in Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores
Packinghouse10 8 and Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Service,
Inc. 109 were dismissed as dicta. 0 The court portrayed Jus-
tice Stewart's dissent in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc. "I as a "suggestion." Hines was distinguished on the
ground that in Seymour there was no final arbitration deci-
sion on which the company could have justifiably relied." 2
The court also characterized the joint liability in Ruzicka v.
General Motors Corp. "3 as an oddity.' ' 4 And finally the
court distinguished Harrison v. United Transportation
Union'1 5 as a case involving deliberate union misconduct
rather than merely arbitrary behavior.' 6
The key to the court's decision in Seymour lies in its ac-
105. The apportionment issue had not been raised at the trial. The parties had
apparently assumed that only attorney's fees would be assessed against the union. Id.
at 212.
106. Id. at 213.
107. Id. at 213-14. The court cited: Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Mil-
stead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981); Bowen v.
United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981); Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean
Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1980); Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers Local Union No. 61, 620 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1980).
108. 581 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1978).
109. 425 F.2d 281 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
110. Seymour, 666 F.2d at 214 n.10.
111. 424 U.S. 554, 572 (1976).
112. Seymour, 666 F.2d at 215 n.13.
113. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
114. Seymour, 666 F.2d at 214 n.12. See also supra text accompanying note 91.
115. 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
116. Seymour, 666 F.2d at 214 n.ll.
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ceptance of the majority approach as "sound policy." 117 The
employer's position was paraphrased by the court: "Olin,
the wrongdoer, protests to the Union: you should be liable
for all damages flowing from my wrong from and after a
certain time, because you should have caught and rectified
my wrong by that time. 1""8 This position was not, the court
said, consistent with the policy of attempting "to afford indi-
vidual employees redress for injuries caused by union mis-
conduct without compromising the collective interests of
union members in protecting limited funds." ' 19 The real rea-
son for assessing damages against the union was to "ensure
that unions will diligently pursue their duty of fair represen-
tation." 12 0 This goal could be adequately accomplished by
the award of attorney's fees and costs, an amount which
might be substantial.'2 1
Seymour has been presented as epitomizing the majority
approach. The latest word on the Stewart approach, and,
indeed, on apportionment of damages in duty of fair repre-
sentation/Section 301 suits, is the case discussed below.
IV. Bo WEN V UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
A. The Facts
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service 2 2 the United
States Supreme Court finally faced squarely the apportion-
ment issue. The facts of the case fell into a familiar pattern.
Bowen, a postal worker and member of the American Postal
Workers Union, was discharged on March 30, 1976 follow-
ing an altercation with another employee. He filed a griev-
ance with the union. His local union took the grievance
through the first three steps of the grievance procedure.
However, decisions to arbitrate were made at the national
level and the national office decided not to pursue the griev-
ance. Bowen brought suit against the union, arguing that it
had breached its duty of fair representation, and against the
117. Id. at 214.
118. Id. at 215.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
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Postal Service for violation of the collective bargaining
agreement in discharging him without just cause.'23
The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Bowen
and the district court entered judgment. The court found
that if Bowen's "apparently meritorious grievance" had been
arbitrated he would have been reinstated by August, 1977.124
Instead, the court found, the union had handled the griev-
ance in an "arbitrary and perfunctory manner," and both
the union and the Service had acted "in reckless and callous
disregard of [Bowen's] rights."'125 The $52,954 award for lost
benefits and wages was apportioned by the jury - $30,000
to be paid by the union, $22,954 to be paid by the Postal
Service. 26 The jury also found the Postal Service and the
union liable for punitive damages of $30,000 and $10,000 re-
spectively. However, the district court set this award aside,
determining that punitive damages could not be assessed
against the Postal Service because of sovereign immunity
and deciding that it would not be equitable for the union to
pay them when the Service was immune. 27
The trial judge also considered the question of reinstate-
ment versus prospective damages. In view of the plaintiff's
"dismal outlook" for reemployment, the court ordered rein-
statement, or in the alternative, $125,000 for future loss of
earnings. 28 In addition, attorney's fees were awarded and
apportioned, oddly enough, with $20,000 to be paid by the
union, $15,000 to be paid by the Postal Service. 29
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted the
trial court's findings of fact and affirmed the apportionment
of liability. 130 However, the court found that "[a]s Bowen's
compensation was at all times payable only by the Service,
reimbursement of his lost earnings continued to be the obli-
gation of the Service exclusively. Hence, no portion of the
123. Id. at 590-91.
124. Id. at 592 n.6.
125. Id. at 591.
126. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (W.D. Va.
1979).
127. Id. at 1131.
128. Id. at 1129-31.
129. Id. at 1129-32.
130. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981).
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deprivations - $47,000.00 plus $5,954.12 - was chargeable
to the Union." 131 The appeals court also refused to increase
the award against the Postal Service and as a result Bowen
was left with a judgment of $22,954.12132 plus reinstatement
or prospective damages 133 and attorney's fees.
The issue as framed by the United States Supreme Court
was "whether a union may be held primarily liable for that
part of a wrongfully discharged employee's damages caused
by his union's breach of its duty of fair representation.' 1 34
The Court held that the damages sustained by Bowen were
initially caused by the Postal Service but were increased by
the union's breach of its duty of fair representation. "Ac-
cordingly, apportionment of the damages was required
.... "-135 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded the case for allocation of
damages consistent with the principles expressed in the opin-
ion. Five justices joined in the opinion; three justices con-
curred as to the remand but dissented as to the Court's
rationale. One justice dissented. 136
B. The Court's Rationale
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 137 the issues
were well joined. The dissent fully articulated the Seymour v.
Olin Corp. 138 approach, while the majority opinion embod-
ied the Stewart approach. Each side asserted that its posi-
tion was firmly grounded in Vaca v. Soes139 and its progeny.
And each side displayed a different conception of the nature
and importance of the duty of fair representation.
Both the majority and the dissent acknowledged the cen-
trality of the grievance procedure in federal labor law, as
well as the necessity of preserving it in order to preserve sta-
131. Id. at 82 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967)).
132. Id. at 82 n.6.
133. Id. at 82.
134. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 590.
135. Id. at 599.
136. Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun concurred in the result and dis-
sented in part. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion.
137. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
138. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
139. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The concurring opinion was authored by Justice White
who also wrote the opinion in Vaca.
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bility within the collective bargaining system.140 The two
groups of Justices disagreed about the effect of a breach of
the duty of fair representation on a Section 301 suit. The
dissent insisted that, as under previous holdings, a breach
merely removes the procedural exhaustion-of-remedies bar
and allows the employee to bring suit, but does not affect the
employer's back pay liability.1 4' On the other hand, the ma-
jority applied a "but for" analysis and concluded that but for
the union's failure to represent the employee fairly, the em-
ployer's breach would have been remedied through the
grievance process. Therefore, "[tihe fault that justifies drop-
ping the bar to the employee's suit for damages also requires
the union to bear some responsibility for increases in the em-
ployee's damages resulting from its breach."'142
The dissent, distinguishing the contract duty of the em-
ployer from the statutory duty of the union, applied its own
"but for" analysis: "But for the employer's breach of con-
tract, there would be no occasion for anyone to reimburse
the plaintiff. . . ."14 The employer, after all, had exclusive
control over reinstatement. 144 The dissent's approach de-
pended upon the application of common-law contract prin-
ciples, a concept which the majority firmly rejected. In the
words of the Court, the dissent's interpretation "fails to rec-
ognize that a collective-bargaining agreement is much more
than traditional common-law employment terminable at
will. Rather, it is an agreement creating relationships and
interests under the federal common law of labor policy.' 1 4 5
Having discarded the theoretical underpinnings of the
Seymour approach, the Court next turned to policy consid-
erations. The majority determined that the right of the em-
ployee was of "paramount importance."'' 46 But, although
the employer should never be shielded from its share of lia-
140. See, e.g., Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 596, 605 n.lI (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 601.
142. 103 S. Ct. at 595.
143. Id. at 603-04 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
in original).
144. Id.
145. 103 St. Ct. at 594.
146. Id. at 595.
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bility because of wrongful conduct by a union, it would be
unjust, in a degree equal to the injustice of preventing recov-
ery by an employee, to require the employer to bear the in-
crease in damages. 1 47  The grievance procedure
"contemplates that both the employer and union will per-
form their respective obligations."'' 48 The Court felt that an
employer had a right to rely on the union fulfilling its obli-
gation to the employee. "By seeking and acquiring the ex-
clusive right and power to speak for a group of employees,
the union assumes a corresponding duty to discharge that
responsibility faithfully - a duty which it owes to the em-
ployees whom it represents and on which the employer with
whom it bargains may rely."'149
Apparently as a result of this "duty" owed by the union
to the employer, the majority found that the union was pri-
marily responsible for damages resulting from its breach
while the Postal Service remained secondarily liable. 50 The
Supreme Court expressed concern that imposing total liabil-
ity on the employer would affect the willingness of employ-
ers to agree to arbitration clauses.' 5 On the other hand, the
Court shrugged off the effect that damages liability would
have on union financial resources. In a footnote the Court
opined that compensatory damage awards "normally will be
limited and finite."'' 5 2 Liability would merely impose a bur-
den consistent with national labor policy in that it would
"provide an additional incentive for the union to process its
members' claims where warranted."' 5 3
The dissent, on the other hand, found no support for the
proposition that the union had a duty to protect the em-
ployer. On the contrary, such a duty seemed to imply an
unbargained-for indemnification clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The minority found it clearly violative
of national labor policy for a court to so modify the substan-
147. Id.
148. Id. at 597.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 595 n.12.
151. Id. at 597.
152. Id. at 597-98 n.16.
153. Id. at 597-98.
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tive terms of a collective bargaining agreement.1 54 The
Court's decision would interfere with the grievance proce-
dure by forcing unions to take unmeritorious grievances to
arbitration merely to avoid liability.1 55 A more disturbing
effect would be the threat to a union's financial stability.
Under the Bowen rule unions would have no way to limit
constantly increasing liability.156 In the past, attorney's fees
and court costs had provided adequate deterrence.1 57 In
short, Bowen did not adequately balance the collective inter-
ests of the employees as against the interests of the employer
and the individual employee. In the absence of the union's
inducement of an employer to breach the contract, a union
should not be liable. Even where the union had affirma-
tively engaged in misconduct, it should only be secondarily
liable. 58
In its opinion the majority accepted the approach urged
by the federal respondent.'5 9 The union would be liable for
any compensatory damages accruing after the hypothetical
date that reinstatement would have occurred had the union
not breached its duty of fair representation. 60
154. Id. at 604-05 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. Id. at 605.
156. Id. at 602-03.
157. Id. at 602 n.6.
158. Id. at 605-06.
159. See generally Brief for Federal Respondent, Bowen v. United States Postal
Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
160. The Federal Respondent had in turn adopted an approach to apportionment
suggested by the student writer in Comment, supra note 16. In adopting the Stewart
approach, he illustrated the apportionment of liability as follows:
Employer Union
Liability Liability





The Court's decision in Bowen v. United States Postal
Service 61 raised a series of new problems for unions which
had previously relied on the apportionment of liability ex-
emplified in Seymour v. Olin Corp. 162 The union's counsel in
Bowen objected to the special verdict form on the general
grounds that "[t]raditionally the union does not pay wages.
And these damages are wholly assessable to the [Service], if
at all.' 1 63
The problem remaining after Bowen is the mechanics of
apportioning damages. No answer can be found in the deci-
sion. The Supreme Court apparently approved the method
employed by the district court. The trial court, first of all,
instructed the jury that apportionment was within its discre-
tion. The trial court then suggested that the employer could
be liable for damages before the date of a hypothetical arbi-
tration decision and the union could be liable for damages
after that date. 64 The court found that if Bowen's grievance
had been arbitrated he would have been reinstated by Au-
gust, 1977.165 The jury adopted the court's suggestion and
apportioned back pay damages to the union after that date.
While the Bowen Court did not object to the trial court's
apportionment method, it did not sanction that method. The
case was remanded and the holding merely stated that "ap-
portionment of damages was required by Vaca."166 Bowen
does not answer the question of how to apportion damages.
Opportunities for creativity abound.
First, if the "real issue" in Bowen is not merely appor-
tionment of damages but the fundamental apportionment of
responsibility between the parties .. ,"1 then it is still
possible to argue that the union found to have breached its
duty should be liable only for attorney's fees or court costs
and not for back pay. The de minimis language in Vaca v.
161. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
162. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
163. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 591 n.3.
164. Id. at 591. See also diagram accompanying supra note 160.
165. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 592 n.6.
166. Id. at 599.
167. Allred, The Bowen Decision: Mandatefor Reexamination ofApportionment
of Damages in Fair Representation Cases, 34 LAB. L.J. 408, 412 (1983).
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Sipes 168 has not been overruled. Second, the Court explicitly
discarded contract liability as the measure of the employer's
damages 69 and implicitly dismissed the trust analogy urged
by the dissent.17 0 Tort law presents the next most obvious
model.
The duty of fair representation has frequently been con-
sidered as analogous to a tort duty.' 7 1 If the employer's lia-
bility were to be similarly characterized then fault could be
apportioned or compared according to the principles of tort
law. The trial court in Bowen seemed to have a tort ap-
proach in mind when it left the apportionment of damages
to the discretion of the jury. 72 As to the mechanics of ap-
portionment, the Bowen Court has opened a new area for
confusion and disagreement among the circuits.
After Bowen the concerns of union attorneys are more
practical than theoretical. The focus is on strategies for min-
imizing union liability. In an address before the American
Bar Association, Section of Labor and Employment Law,
Attorney Anton G. Hajjar put forth these suggestions for un-
dermining the effect of Bowen:
1. Employ jury instructions allowing the jury to assess
less than post-arbitration backpay against the union.
2. Shift it to the employer by undermining its reliance
on the union's conduct.
3. Demand arbitration or seek an order compelling it
to remove the case from the jury.
4. Bargain for an appeal procedure which can result
in a reinstated grievance, or for indemnification by the em-
ployer, or make the grievance procedure non-exclusive for
high-liability grievances.
5. Oppose jury trials.
6. Oppose awards of attorneys fees. 173
168. 386 U.S. 171, 199 (1967).
169. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 594.
170. Id. at 606 (citing Cox, supra note 8, at 652). Id. at 606 n. 14.
171. See, e.g., Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,
425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1970).
172. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 591.
173. Address by Anton G. Hajjar, American Bar Association, Section of Labor




The foregoing survey of duty of fair representation law
which focused on Bowen v. United States Postal Service 174
and the issue of the apportionment of liability, reveals a
complex, confused and confusing body of law. The theme
has been simple: the more the courts have intervened, the
more complicated matters have become. Several analytical
factors have emerged, however, which, if applied to each
duty of fair representation decision, will contribute to a con-
sistent development of the law.
Analysis must begin by expressly acknowledging that the
duty of fair representation functions within the system of la-
bor relations and requires an acceptance of the idiosyncra-
cies of labor law. Chief among these is the centrality of the
grievance-arbitration mechanism. 175 Such a system is deli-
cately balanced and requires that labor and management
feel confident that they will be free to settle grievances to-
gether in the manner they have selected under the collective
bargaining agreement. 76 A sophisticated grievance system
also requires that a union be willing to decide against an
employee if a grievance lacks merit. 177 The perpetual threat
of court review means that a union can no longer absolutely
guarantee that a grievance once settled will stay settled.:178
The results of this threat are frequently recited: "less set-
tlement at the early stages of grievance adjustments, more
arbitrations, lengthier, more contentious hearings, more for-
mality 17 9 and evidentiary objections, and a tendency to ad-
vance any conceivable argument, however flimsy it may
appear."'180 It is too late to request that the "law stay out"''
of the arbitral system, but each court should be aware of the
174. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
175. See, e.g., Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 689 (1981).
176. Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1168.
177. Waldman, supra note 6, at 289.
178. Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1171.
179. One commentator has questioned whether unions will now be required to
provide lawyers to represent employees at arbitration hearings. Waldman, supra note
6, at 290-91. Of course, even an attorney may not be able to assure freedom from
liability. See Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974) (an attorney
represented the plaintiff but the union was still found to have breached its duty of fair
representation).
180. Waldman, supra note 6, at 289-90 (footnote added).
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effects of judicial interference upon that system and attempt
to minimize them.
Next, courts must balance all of the interests affected
under a collective bargaining agreement when it decides a
duty of fair representation issue. These include not only the
interests of the individual employee, the employer and the
union, but also those other interests as defined by Cox - the
unassorted interests of the employees as a group, the future
interests of the employees and the present interests of em-
ployees who may be in competition with the grievant. 182 If
the courts are going to review grievances, then they must
protect the same interests that arbitrators attempt to
consider.
The difficulty is that these interests frequently overlap
and sometimes cannot be severed as neatly as a court might
like. For example, the duty of fair representation, in some
ways, identifies the interests of the employer with those of
the union:
One of the ironies of the doctrine of fair representation
in arbitration matters is the inhibitions it necessarily places
upon the employer in what is essentially an adversary pro-
cess. In order for the employer to achieve what he expects
and hopes to obtain out of the arbitration, the union must
be performing fairly and adequately; otherwise the em-
ployer's own efforts will be useless and he will have to retry
in the courts the same dispute he thought had been re-
solved in arbitration. 83
Certainly the individual has an important interest to protect,
but the courts must neither lose sight of the other interests
involved, nor emphasize the rights of the individual em-
ployee to the point where the grievance arbitration mecha-
nism and the stability of the system is undermined.8 4
Finally, the courts must consider duty of fair representa-
tion law as one body and view each part in relation to the
181. Dean Shulman made this remark in a famous speech in which he argued
against the law providing remedies for breach of collective bargaining agreements
and argued in favor of maintaining judicial noninterference with arbitration. Feller,
A General Theory, supra note 6, at 689 (citing Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in
Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1001 (1955)).
182. See Cox, supra note 8.
183. Waldman, supra note 6, at 294.
184. Id. at 280; Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1169.
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other. Procedural issues must not be considered in a vac-
uum, but must always be viewed in relation to the substan-
tive law, with an eye toward maintaining the balance in the
labor relations system. For example, if, as it appears, the
standard for the breach of duty of fair representation is tend-
ing toward negligence, then it will become easier for employ-
ees to prevail in a duty of fair representation suit. But
clearly unions do not possess unlimited resources.', 5 It is
reasonable in this context to adjust the remedial or proce-
dural arms of the law.
Testing Bowen v. United States Postal Service 86 against
these analytical factors yields mixed results. First of all, the
Bowen Court demonstrated a real acceptance and under-
standing of the practical functioning of the duty of fair rep-
resentation within the collective bargaining system and the
grievance procedure. 87 It accepted the Steelworkers Trilogy
characterization of the collective bargaining agreement as a
code rather than a simple contract. 8  Further, the Court
recognized the stabilizing effect of its decision. As a practi-
cal matter Bowen has put a cap on the back pay liability of
the employer. 89 In the Court's view, that should strengthen
the employer's reliance on the union's decision. The em-
ployer will not, thereby, be placed in a position more detri-
mental than if the employee had acted on his own behalf.
This increased reliance by the employer will make him more
willing to participate in the grievance-arbitration system and
consequently the system will be strengthened.1 90
This overriding concern with employer reliance was the
hallmark of the Court's attempt to balance the interests in-
volved in the apportionment of liability. The interest of the
individual was identified as of "paramount importance."' 19'
185. Isaacson, supra note 37, at I.
186. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
187. Id. at 593-97.
188. Id. at 596. See supra note 21.
189. Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1166.
190. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 597.
191. Id. at 595. This language may prove to be as significant as the holding in
Bowen and has already been cited to support an employee's right to have his union
dispute resolved in federal court rather than before the National Railroad Adjustment
Board where he had reasonably relied upon his union to process his grievance. See
Kaschak v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 707 F.2d 902, 909 (6th Cir. 1983).
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As indicated above, the employer's interests were sympathet-
ically considered. However, the Court completely disre-
garded any effects of the Bowen rule on the ability of the
union to function. The Court ignored evidence of an al-
ready overworked arbitration system, both within the Postal
Workers Union 192 and nationwide among all unions.19 3 The
threat of an undue financial burden 94 on unions was also
glibly dismissed, even though it was clear that a union may
now have the bulk of the financial responsibility when un-
successful in a duty of fair representation/Section 301 suit. 95
This callous disregard of the union's interests was in har-
mony with the Court's emphasis on the "power" and "au-
thority" of the union. 196  Nowhere did the Court
acknowledge the collective interests of the employees as a
group or recognize that a union's ability to function was as
necessary to the stability of the system as was the confidence
of the employer.
Nor did the Court consider the standard applied in duty
of fair representation cases as having any impact on the
proper apportionment of liability. 97 Indeed, the opinion re-
flected a lack of concern. In a footnote the Court dismissed
the possibility that the Bowen rule would cause an undue
financial burden on unions. "An award of compensatory
damages, however, normally will be limited and finite.
Moreover, the union's exercise of discretion is shielded by the
192. See Brief for Respondent at Appendix, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv.,
103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
193. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 601 n.4 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
194. Nor will requiring the union to pay damages impose a burden on the
union inconsistent with a national labor policy. It will provide an additional
incentive for the union to process its members' claims where warranted. This
is wholly consistent with a union's interest. It is a duty owed to its members as
well as consistent with the union's commitment to the employer under the ar-
bitration clause.
Id. at 597-98.
195. Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1167.
196. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 597.
197. See Wollett, Supreme Court Report. Five Cases Focus on Grievance Arbitra-
lion, 69 A.B.A. J. 1892 (1983). The author suggests "that union attitudes on whether
a case should go to arbitration should depend on standards that the courts apply in
determining whether the duty of fair representation requires arbitration," rather than
whether a union will be held liable for damages under Bowen. Id. at 1894.
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standard necessary to prove a breach of the duty of fair
representation. -198
But surely this is the crux of the problem. At what point
does the shield begin to deteriorate and the delicately bal-
anced grievance-arbitration system begin to break down
under the financial and administrative strain?199 Bowen does
not consider this problem because the decision was limited
to resolving the issue of the apportionment of liability. It is
this tunnel vision approach to fair representation law which
has given us confusion and disagreement rather than an in-
tegrated body of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The apportionment of damages in a duty of fair repre-
sentation/Section 301 suit posed a difficult problem for the
Supreme Court. Neither of the two lines of cases on the is-
sue presented a completely satisfactory theory. Conse-
quently, the Court based its decision on policy
considerations. In so doing, however, the Supreme Court
limited its considerations to the apportionment question in-
stead of also considering the standard which provides the
basis for the suit. The remedial question was severed from
the substantive law.
Bowen is true to breed. Rather than producing a more
reliable body of law, the Court's tinkering in Bowen has pro-
duced more uncertainty, more questions and more opportu-
nity for inconsistency among the circuits.
ELIZABETH STEPHENS
198. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 598 n.16 (emphasis added).
199. For some thoughts on the matter, see Isaacson, supra note 38, at 1170; Kopp,
supra note 6, at 12-13; Waldman, supra note 6, at 294-95.
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